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NOTE AND COMMENT
EFrEcr OF AN AGREEMENT BY ONE PERSON.TO SUPPLY ANOTHER'S 
QUIREMENTS" OF A GIVEN COMMoDITY.-The cases show that the kind of agree-
ment indicated by the heading of this note has become an established part 
of
business usage. In normal times such an agreement is likely to be carried
out to the entire satisfaction of both parties, without question, but, 
in a
period of changing business conditions and abnormal price flctuations 
such
as we have witnessed during the last few years, nice questions of interpreta-
tion are likely to arise, as is well illustrated by the recent case of Oscar
Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Coopers Glue Factory, (192o) 179 N. Y. S. 271.
The defendant agreed to supply' the plaintiff with its "requirements 
of
'Special BB' glue for the year x916" at nine cents per pound, deliveries 
to
be made as ordered by it. The plaintiff was a jobber and, as defendant 
well
knew, bought only for re-sale to the trade. When it received an 
order for
glue it sent a requisition to the defendant which filled it. Similar 
contracts
had been entered into by the parties for each of the four years immediately
preceding the contract in question. During that time the price 
of glue had
remained stable, and plaintiff had secured orders for from sixty to 
seventy
barrels, of 500 pounds each, per year. During the latter part 
of the year
1gi6, the price of glue went steadily upward from nine to twenty-five 
cents
per pound. The plaintiff, evidently not averse to doing a little profiteering,
having increased its sales force from eight to eighteen, pushed 
the sale of
glue to such an extent-sometimes apparently by offering it at 
a substantial
reduction from the prevailing market price-that it succeede4 
in getting
orders amounting, for the year, to three hundred and forty 
barrels. Defend-
ant shipped one hundred and thirty barrels but refused to supply 
the balance,
and when sued, resisted a recovery on two grounds, viz., (x) 
that the agree-
ment was not binding for want of mutuality. (2) that in 
any event the word
"requirements," properly interpreted, meant simply that defendant was to
supply glue to an amount substantially equivalent to what had 
been ordered
by the plaintiff during the preceding year. Both points were 
resolved against
the defendant by a divided court.
It seems quite Obvious that in the proper interpretation of 
the word "re-
quirements," as used in the agreement, is to be found 
the correct solution
of both of the problems suggested by the defendant. According 
to the usual
definition given by standard dictionaries the word may 
be used in eitner
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one of two distinct senses. It may mean (I) the act of requiring or demand-
ing, (2) something required or needed. If the word is to be interpreted in
the sense first indicated, then it is clear that the agreement is not a contract
for want of a sufficient consideration to support the seller's promise. If the
buyer agrees to take only what he requires in the sense of what he 'demands'
or calls for, his promise is wholly illusory, since it amounts to no more than
saying that he will do what he will do. See American etc. Co. v. Kirk, 68
Fed. 791; Teipel v. Meyer, io6 Wis. 4t; Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. K. C. Bolt
and Nut Co., 114 Fed. 77. But if it is to be interpreted in the second sense
to mean that the buyer will take from the seller what he needs, then there
is consideration, for if he buys what he needs from the seller, he necessarily
gives up the right to buy elsewhere and consequently suffers a legal detri-
ment. Following the principle which says" that a "contract, if capable of two
equally reasonable interpretations, should be given that interpretation which
will tend to support it," (Lurton, J., in Lima Locomotive etc. Co. v. National
etc. Co., 155 Fed. 77) the courts have quite generally upheld such agreements.
Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., i6o Ill. 85; T. W. Jenkins &
Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958, and cases therein cited. Courts
have at times assumed that, because of a supposed requirement of mutuality,
this result would follow only in a case where the agreement is made in con-
nection with an established business, having needs capable of reasonably
definite pre-estimate; and have held that the agreement is unenforcible
where, as in the principal case, the buyer buys for re-sale only and is in such
a position as to make it uncertain whether or not he will need any of the
commodity at all. T. W. Jenkins Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 237 Fed. 278,
commented on in 15 MICH. L. Rgv. 441, reversed 247 Fed. 958; Crane v. Crane
& Co., io5 Fed. 869. The same supposed requirement has in a few cases
been relied upon as a basis for the holding that the buyer impliedly promises
to continue his business for.the period during which the contract, by its
terms, is to continue in force-the theory being that if he continues in busi-
ness he will need a quantity of the commodity, and thus there will be
present the requisite rIutuality: Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 61i; Wells v.
Alexandre, 13o N. Y. 642; Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tenn. Phosphate
Co., 121 Fed. 298. Such decisions are clearly erroneous. All that the phrase
"mutuality of obligation" can legitimately be held to mean in this connection
is, that to make a bilateral agreement enforcible as a contract, each side must
furnish a consideration. In accord with the principal case on this point
are the following: T. W. Jenkins Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., supra; Ramey
Lumber Co. v. John Schroeder Lumber Co., 237 Fed. 39; McKeever etc. Co.
v. Canonsburg Iron Co., 138 Pa. St. 184; Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. v.
Fiore, 47 Utah io8. The anomalous decisions just referred to have appar-
ently resulted from a belief on the part of some courts that they were
necessary to prevent a gross injustice being perpetrated upon the seller.
They have thought that without the requirement of mutuality, as they inter-
preted it, the seller would be wholly at the mercy of the buyer. Disregarding
the obvious argument that the seller entered into the agreement with his
eyes open, which after all is not an answer to the position taken, there seems
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to be another means of accomplishing the result aimed at-the protection of
the seller-which is perfectly consistent with the fundamental principles of
contract law.. The word, "requirements," as used in the agreement, is capable of and
demands further interpretatioh to determine the extent of the obligation
of the buyer and the seller respectively. In other words, does the word,
"requirements," connote that the buyer will take and the seller will furnish
any quantity, however large or small, that the buyer may need in any con-
ceivable contingency which may arise; or does it indicate a quantity variable
within certain somewhat indefinite but nevertheless real limits,--the quantity
purposely being left indefinite by the parties because of the uncertainty due
to normal fludtuations in needs. Either use of the word would seem to be
legitimate. It does not require any stretch of the imagination to see that
when the seller agrees to furnish to another, who is engaged in a business
with which the former is familiar, "his requirements," he has in mind a
quantity capable of fairly definite pre-estimate. The word may be intended
as the equivalent of the statement of a definite quantity qualified with the
words "more or less," which it is held merely provide against slight and acci-
dental variations. Hills v. Edmund Pcycke Co., 14 Cal. App. 32; Geiger v.
Kaesiner, 148 Ill. App. 529; Santa Paula Commercial Co. v. Parkhurst-Dazis
Mercantile Co., 86 Kan. 328; Little Rock Cooperage Co. v. Gunnels, 82 Ark.
286.
Obviously no a priori rule can be laid down for determining in a particular
case which interpretation is the correct one. This must depend upon 
the
apparent intention of the parties to be deduced from all the circumstances
surrounding the transaction. If it appears that the obligation was reasonably
understood to be unlimited, there is no valid reason why it should not be
enforced in that way, but, on the other hand, if it was not so understood, then
justice and common sense alike* demand that it be not so enforced. As 
is
said in POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS (3rd Am. Ed.) 308, 309, "We must look to the
state of things as known to and affecting the parties at the time of 
the
promise, including their information and competence with regard to the ma-
ter in hand, and then see what expectation the promisor's words, as uttered
in that state of things, would have created in the mind of a reasonable man
in" the promisee's place and with the same ineans of judgment." Viewed
from this angle the conclusion of the majority of the court in the principal
case would seem to be erroneous. If all the circumstances are taken 
into
account it is difficult to suppose that the plaintiff could reasonably 
have be-
lieved that the defendant intended to bind itself to supply an unlimited
quantity. For a case apparently taking the view here suggested see T. 
TV.
Jenkins Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958, 962 (semble). On 
this
basis the result in such cases as Hickey v. O'Brien, Wells v. Alexandre, 
and
Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tenn. Phosphate Co., cited supra, becomes 
in-
telligible. Where the facts show that the buyer is to make a special 
effort to
push the sale of the seller's product then such a limitation 
on the seller's
obligation obviously should not and does not exist. See New York 
Central
Iron Works v. U. S. Radiator Co., 174 N. Y. 331. 
G. C. G.
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